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In 1932 Dean Smith wrote for this Review: "The Report by the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents is among the
significant documents which have appeared in recent years."' He referred
to a report to the Columbia University Committee for Research in the Social
Sciences which was made on the basis of a survey of the economic con-
sequences of automobile accidents.2 The Columbia Study included an
investigation of thousands of actual cases, which represented a fair sample of
experience, both urban and rural, across the nation.3 It seems to me that
this survey is probably the most significant contribution to the study of torts
to appear so far in the twentieth century.4
Another landmark study of the economic consequences of accidental
injury, the Railroad Study, made by the Railroad Retirement Board, covered
work injuries in the railroad industry for the years 1938-19 4O.
These careful and comprehensive case studies both dealt with the way
accident losses were actually being met under a common law system of liability
and with the consequences of uncompensated losses in terms of human hard-
ship to the injured persons, their families, and others indirectly affected.
Both studies contained grave indictments of the present system. These may
be summarized as follows:
(1) Despite a few very high awards, the common law system by and
large did not fully compensate accident victims even for their actual economic
loss. This inadequacy was especially pronounced where the loss was greatest,
in serious and fatal injury cases.6
* Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Smith, The Problem and Its Solution, in Compensation for Automobile Accidents:A Symposium, 32 CoLuM. L. REv. 785 (1932).
Z COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO
THEICOLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932)
[hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA STUDY).
3. Id. at 8-13, 255-82.
4. The only real rivals, in my opinion, are the earlier studies which led to work-
men's compensation legislation. A brief reference to them may be found in 1 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 5.20 (1952). See also MILLIS & MONTGOMERY,
LABOR'S RISKS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 189 (1938); REISENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN
SocIAL LEGISLATION 131 (1950). Perhaps the best known of these is the report of the
Wainwright Commission in New York. 25 N.Y. SENATE Doc. No. 38 (1910).
5. U.S. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BD., WORK INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
1938-40 (1947) [hereinafter cited as RAILROAD STUDY].
6. The Columbia Study showed that some payment was made in over 85% of all
cases where defendant was insured. COLUMBIA STUDY 75, 77, 86, 87, 204, 262. When the
amount of payment is compared with the economic loss, however, the following appears:
"In the small loss groups the losses in the insured cases are more than covered by the
payment received, while in the large loss groups the losses are not covered." Id. at 266.
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(2) Where defendant was financially irresponsible no signifitant pay-
ments were made,7 but even where there was -financial responsibility -inade-
quacy of compensation was marked.8
(3) Where payment was made, it 'was often" delayed,' with hardship
consequent upon the delay, particularly Where the loss Was serious.' Where
litigation was'resorted to, this 'delay was greatly increased.9
(4) The great majority of persons injured' had beenin the lower' incoi'ne
groups,10 and most payments for injuries resulted from'a process 'of bargaining
wherein the claimant was in -the Weaker bargaining, position' because' of his
economic 'need and the 'prospeCts of- delay. The more serious the loss, the
weaker his bargaining positin."l
(5) There was a great disparity' in teceipt of payments" Iamong those
suffering similar economic losses-a colidition of feast and famine.'2
This conclusion is based upon computations of -wage loss plus medical, expense, up tothe time of investigation only. The Committee declared that "if it were possible to
compute the future loss in earning capacity and the future medical 'expense 'for' these
cases and relate this total loss to the payment received, .- .. the -settlements, [in Iserious
cases] would be found to be even more inadequate." Ibid.
'The study showed that in permanent disability- cases wherein defendants were insured,
payments were nearly, twice the losses where losses were under $250;..payments were
about 50% 'gieater than losses where losses were 'betweei $250 and $749;losses 'exceeded
payments: by, the ratio of, about 7 to -6 -where losses were between $750 and -$2,499;
losses were over twice the amount of payments where losses were between $2,500 and
$4,999, and nearly three times the amount 'of 'pyments where losses -eceeded '$5,000.
dThe Rallroad Study showed-tat in cases involving a surviving W'Aow anchildren,
compensation for fatal injuries- to men under sixty-, represtented ,'a ,restorati6n on the
average of about one-third of the wage loss." RAILROAD STUDY 12. For permanent total
disability,-fpayment averaged-607o of th'e wagesthe emploeemighT'ave earnedii-lbid.
For permanent partial disabilities .the: net payments :restored! between.-one-fourth" and,one-half, of the wagp- loss., Id. at 13. Thus it will be noted that -in -the 'employee )Cases
the proportion of wage, loss restored, in, cases involving rion-fatal injuries, was slightly
higher in cases of serious loss than in less serious cases. See also note 121 infra.-.,
For.- summaries of some of the 'findings of the two 'studies, see-,Cdfstvet, The Un-
compensated Accident and lt s C6nsequences, 3 LAxw &, CONTEmP' ,,PRon., 466' (1936) ;
Pollack, Worknen'r Coinpenation'for Railroad Work JnjurieS and Diseases, 36 GORN LL
L .Q , 236 , (1951).,, . ' ., .... .. 1 . .' ' .. .. ... ..' . , _,
7.' The Columbia Study showed that in the uninsuted defendant cases some payment
,was made in 27% of the temporary disability cases, in 2 1o of such permanent, disability
cases, and in only '17% of such cases involving fatalities: COL ,BIA STDtmY, 75,- Payments
covered economic'loss up to time of settlement ;in. only .11% oftheiminsured defendant
cases involving temporary, disability and in only about 5% of such casts involving, ser!i s
loss. Id. at 203-04.- See also id. ati261-66,-269-73,. . ... ' ' . ' - -
8. See note 6 itpra;-note 12 .nfra.. - . ' '
9. See COLUMBIA STUDY 205, 278-80; RALRoAD STUDY 146-58. . . -
10. The Columbia Study found that in the great majority of cases studiedthe family
%was upported, by one or more -wage earners receiving small wages, and that "'most of
the adults who were injured were -themselves -earners, three-fourths of whom earned less
than $40 a week." COLUMBIA STUDY, 55. See also id. at 66, 218-20;' RAMROADI STUDY
67-68; Corstvet, supra note 6, at 471-75.
11. See RAiLRoAD- STUDY 47; Corstvet, supra .note, 6,. at 468; Pollack, .- tpra note 6,
at242-45. ' . '. : '
12, See CoiUmBIA STUDY 266-68.' The Railroad Study- made -an even more complete
tabulation of the, disparity between payments and losses. See' RAILROAD -STUDY 13.' It
contains many suggestive tables., Id. ati 101, 107, 115, 119, 129,_ 133. The illuminating
text accompanying these tables points out that while the-adjusted average wage restora-
tion in permanent total disability cases is 607, "this average is little, more than the
midpoint of a wide range, which shows that in ,11 cases out of 83, payment covers less
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(6) Even those who got large payments were not able to preserve these
sums so as to assure themselves against continuing economic losses from the
accidents.' 3
The Columbia Study concluded that a system was needed which would
distribute payments more promptly and more equitably according to losses,
and which would provide for meeting future needs by periodic payments.
It proposed a scheme of compensation for automobile accidents along the lines
of workmen's compensation acts.14
In spite of the grave defects of our present system as a method of com-
pensating accident victims, only one jurisdiction in the Anglo-American world,
the province of Saskatchewan, Canada, has adopted a system of compensation
in any field besides that of industrial accidents.1 The tendency among
European countries has been towards strict liability in motor vehicle cases,
but none of them has substituted modified scheduled losses for tort damages.' 0
The continued failure of this proposal to secure wider adoption prompts
several inquiries. Is the need still there; or have the glaring defects been
partly cured under the present system? If they have not, are there defects in
the proposed system as grave as, or graver than, those we now have, so that
the proposal deserves to fail on the merits? If a compensation system is
desirable on the merits, how can we account for the failure? It is the purpose
of this article to consider these questions.
The studies we are considering dealt with events that happened some time
ago: the Columbia Study nearly three decades, the Railroad Study nearly
than a quarter of the loss, in 25 cases from one-quarter to one-half, in 28 cases fromone-half to three-quarters, and in the remaining 19 cases three-quarters or more." Id.at 120. See also Pollack, supra note 6, at 248 (range in permanent total disability casesfrom zero to $50,000).13. See RAILROAD SrUDY 15, 16, 166-76; Pollack, supra note 6, at 250-51. TheColumbia Study did not investigate this aspect of the problem.14. See COLUMBIA STUDY 215-17; cf. id. at 237-45. The Railroad Study does notcontain an explicit recommendation of compensation legislation for railroad workers.However, one member of the Railroad Retirement Board remonstrated because "in largepart, the report consists of argument, express or implied, in support of a system of work-men's compensation for railroad employees." RAILROAD STUDY 219. This member believedthat the report therefore went beyond the authority conferred by the Senate resolutionauthorizing the Board to make the investigation and report. In reply the chairman ofthe Board pointed to the letter from the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee trans-mitting the resolution to the Board and said that in view of its language "and of theactual findings of the study which, without advocating, show the need for a work-men's compensation system in the railroad industry, it would have been perfectly
proper, in my opinion, if the report had made specific recommendations for the enact-ment of such a system." See RAILROAD STUDY 223-24.
15. SASK. REV. STAT. ch. 371 (1953). The plan is described in SASKATCHEWAN
GOV'T INSURANCE OFFICE, THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE ACT (1958); Grad,
Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUm. L. Rv. 300,320-25 (1950). The plan was discussed in Wis. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT ON
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, Vol. II, pt. II, at 132-66 (1953). The Legislative Council
did not recommend adoption of compensation for Wisconsin, but it did find that thescheme was a success in Saskatchewan and was accepted by a majority of citizensthere as a "worthwhile venture." Id. at 161, 165-66. See also N.D. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
Com., REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 26-51 (1950).
16. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workluen's Coipen-
sation, [0 NACCA L.J. 44 (1952).
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two. Much has happened since then, including war, inflation, and prosperity.
Dean Smith said in 1932: "Verdicts in excess of $10,000 were very rare,
most of them occurring in New York City .... "z Today we often read of
verdicts which are fabulous by contrast.' 8 The personal injury plaintiffs' bar
has become organized into an articulate association with a vigorous educational
program for its members, clamoring for the ever more "adequate award."'19
The application of legal rules has changed measurably so that both the re-
quirement of fault and the strength of defendants' defenses have been diluted.20
The role of the jury has expanded.2 1 A greater proportion of automobiles are
insured.22 There has been a great increase in hospital and medical insurance ;23
and other forms of social insurance have also had an effect.24
Has the impact of all these things changed the situation fundamentally?
The awards to successful litigants have certainly been increased by more than
the rise in the cost of living, and much larger amounts are now paid in settle-
ment of the dramatic, outstanding cases. But how have accident victims fared
by and large? Has there been prompter and more equitable distribution of
payments according to losses? Or do we still have feast and famine-jackpot
justice, but with larger prizes for the winners?
17. Smith, supra note 1, at 794.
18. The National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys tabulates inits publication, NACCA Law Journal, verdicts or awards exceeding $50,000. See, e.g.,20 NACCA L.J. 388-404 (1957), listing 53 verdicts and awards of $100,000 or more,mostly for the period from March to November 1957. The highest award to a singleplaintiff was a jury verdict in Chicago for $750,000, "believed to be the largest awardin a single case in the history of the nation." Id. at 398. This case was finally settled
for $600,000. 21 NACCA L.J. 407 (1958). Of the 53 awards for $100,000 or over, only
8 of them were made in New York State.
19. For a brief statement of the history and purposes of the National Association
of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, see Horovitz, Editorial, 10 NACCA L.J. 17
(1952); Lambert, Editorial, 18 NACCA L.J. 25 (1956).
The term "adequate award" has become particularly associated with its use by
Melvin M. Belli, former president of the organization. See Belli, The Adequate Award,
39 CALIF. L. Ray. 1 (1951).
20. See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 12.1-.3 (1956) ; James, Inroads on Old
Tort Concepts (pts. 1-2), 14 NACCA L.J. 226, 15 NACCA L.J. 281 (1954-1955);
Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation (pts.
1-2), 9 NACCA L.J. 20, 10 NACCA L.J. 44 (1952).
As to railroad work injuries, the change in the legal climate is well known. The
Railroad Study found that for the years 1938-1940 over one-half of FELA cases disposed
of by judgment after contest were in favor of defendant. RAILROAD STUDY 46. By 1951,
opponents of compensation for railroad workers were able to argue that "it is evident
[from recent leading cases] that the F.E.L.A. does impose liability upon the employer
for almost every type of railroad accident . . . " Richter & Forer, The Railroad In-
dustry and Work-Incurred Disabilities, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 203, 232 (1951).
21. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 15.1-.5, 16.10, 17.1-2, 18.8 (1956).
22. This is widely claimed to be the result of safety responsibility legislation. See,
e.g., Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation, 15
OHIO ST. L.J. 110, 121 (1954); Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1300, 1310 (1953).
23. See McVay, Reply to "The Case for Compulsory Automobile Conpensation
Insurance,' 15 OHio ST. L.J. 161, 170 (1954) ; N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 1, cols. 7, 8
("In New York State, more than 90 per cent of the population has some form of
health insurance . .. ").
24 This bas been particularly true in railroad work accidents. Pollack, Vupra note
6, at 263. But today even a person injured in an automobile accident may receive work-
men's compensation payments, social security benefits, and, in a very few states, disa-
bility benefits.
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One of the foremost needs in the study of torts during this third quarter
of our century is a comprehensive factual examination, of the economic con-
sequences of automobile accidents which will: (1) bring up to datethe findings
made in the Columbia Study; (2) find out what claimants have done with the
largeamounts paid them for injuries or death involving substantial future
economicloss, and the extent to which that disposition has enabled, claimants
to -meet future, losses; and (3) determine whether' periodic payments (e.g.,
-under workmen's compensation) have in fact been more effective than lump
sum'payments to meet future losses.2 5
--- It is entirely possible not only that compensation is still inequitably dis-
tributed and is ,onthe whole too little and too late, but also that,'eveni the
large awards are too often dissipated by improvidence and unwise investment
so that they are less effective to meet future, needs 'than much smaller amounts
wouldibe if'paid periodically. A good deal of what we do know points to these
conclusions., Much 'of what was found in the older studies can be seen to result
from human nature itself or from, aspects of the situation, such as calendar
delay, 6 -which have:not improved. Later studies, although not comprehensive
enough, suggest that there has been no fundamental change.2 7 Opponents of
25. Such a study would be expensive and difficult to carry out. It should include, for
instance, a comparison ofcases in' which lump sums have been paid with cases involving
similar ifijuiles in which-periodic, payments have'been made, 'Thedlsposition of payments
in each case' in the two, groups and the effectiveness of those payments in meeting the
needs of the injured'person and his:family would then have to betraced. This would call
for maximum' cooperdtion'from people being investigated about what they would regard
as intimate details. Theii'-natural resistance to such inquiries would be buttressed by the
fact that their mdst likely advisers on the subject' (e.g., their lawyers and labor organiza-
tions) would probably be opposed to the making of such a study.
26. See 'Burger, The Courts on Tial:_ A Call for Action Against Delay, 44 'A.B.A.J.738 (1958):. .. .
27. A study was made of' automobile accidents occurring in Philadelphia in 1953.
Temple, University "Bureau! of' 'Economic and Business Research, Economie-Fnancial
Consequences' of 'PersoMl Injuries Sustained; in 1953 Philadelphia Anib Aceiddnts, 7
EcoN. & Bus. BULL. No. 3 (March 1955). Since this study' is not widely available; some
of its findings will' be noted here: -' I- tme 'statui of earner victims, nonfatal cases. 27.6% carried less than $50 a week,
32.6% betwe&n,$51 and $70, 31.3% between 71 and $100. Id. at 27.
"Personal injuries resulting :from automobile accidents result in out-of-pocket loss,
a large partof which is never recovered.' Id.'at,90. See also id. at85.' I I'...,, While- theie: was 'some form of hbspital'ihsurance in about 45%o of the cases studied,
"the incidence 'of surgical 'coverages, increases with income, and cash disability policies
were reported, only among the upper income groups." Id.-at. 30. Most of what was paid
on. accouht of 'injuries came from third-party' liability insurance, id. at 85-86,, 90, but
uninsured automobiles caused substantially more than their proportionate share of
accidents, id, 'at 32-,33. ' I I I
"Settlement' amounts' have' littl& equity as between groups, injuries, and circum-
stances, varying most with litigation." Id. at 90. While extent of liability and amount
of 'expenses influence the amounts, paid 'in settlements, these "show more variation, in
terms of amount' Iith' other personal factors, especially community, status and business
position. -The most important variable, however, is the retention of an attorney by the
claimant." Id.- at 87,, "The attitudes of insurers 'calling fori 'buying' claims for as little
as- possible and the deteriorations of the application of the strict legal principles of
liability to settling such cases has given rise to [the fact that the retention of an attorney
substantially improves the chance 'of collecting as well as the amount paid in settle-
ment] . . . ." Id. at 91.
A study of the economic consequences of automobile accidents in New Haven, Con-
necticut during 1948 and 1949 is reported in James & Law, Compensation for Auto Acci-
dent Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70 (1952).
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compensation continue to claim that payments made under proposed plans
would far exceed those made at present.28 If that is true, it is the very best
evidence of the present system's inadequacy. Everyone knows the modest
schedules of payments under compensation acts. Everyone knows too of the
very large verdicts awarded in some cases under the present system, verdicts
many times the maximum awards under any compensation scheme. If, in
spite of these high awards, the total amount paid for claims today is far lower
than it would be under a compensation system, then the amount paid on most
claims must indeed be very far below that which would be paid under com-
pensation-and even compensation would restore only a fraction of the actual
economic loss. Pending further studies, then, it is reasonable to assume that
the over-all inadequacy, the inequity, and the delays of the common law system
are stiU with us.
A compensation system which would assure to all persons injured by
motor accidents substantial and expeditious compensation for their economic
loss and which would ptovide periodic payments for future needs would go
far to cure these defects. The question, then, becomes whether an attempt to
provide such a system would bring about even greater evils. This broad ques-
tion has many facets andicalls for an evaluation of some of the objections
raised against the proposal. In making this evaluation it is important always
to distinguish between the characteristics which such a scheme must have in
order to eliminate the evils aimed at and other characteristics which any given
proposal may have but which ate not indispensable for the main purpose.
At the threshold is an objection which divides men philosophically.
Some oppose compensation because it provides for liability without fault and
for recovery even by one who has himself been negligent. They argue that
those who want protection against injuries resulting from their own fault
or from nobody's fault should insure, and that the innocent should not be
The studies conducted in Philadelphia and New Haven are briefly described in
Marx, "Motorisin," Not "Pedestrianism": Compensation for Automobile's Victims, 42
A.B.A.J. 421, 423-24 (1956).
One of the foremost students of the problem has recently concluded that "as a means
of giving adequate protection against the machines of the highway, negligence law has
run its course. Something better must be found." GREEN, TRAFFIc VIcTIms-ToRT LAW
AND IN SURANCE 82 (1958). See also id. at 101.
28. This point was made by early opponents of compensation for automobile acci-dents. See Lilly, Criticism of the Proposed Solution, in Compensation for Automobile
Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUmx. L. REv. 785, 803 (1932); Sherman, Grounds for
Opposing the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 598(1936). It is still stressed today. See McVay, Reply to "The Case for Compulsory
Automobile Compensation Insurance," 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 161, 168, 169 (1954); Ryan &Greene, PedeStrianimn: A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117, 183 (1956). Mr. McVay,an insurance executive, 'would estimate that the cost of Mr. Marx' plan .. .wouldbe two or three times that of the present day insurance policy, and perhaps closer to
five or six times that cost." McVay, supra at 169. Mr. Marx' plan contemplated pay-ments at the modest level of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act. See Marx, Com-
pensation Itsurance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory
Automobile Insrance, 15 OnIo ST. L.J. 134, 142-44 (1954). In spite of the implications
of the strong statement just quoted, Mr. McVay finds the present system quite adequate.
See McVay, supra at 162; McVay, The Case Against Compulsory Automobile Insurance,15 OH Io ST. L.J. 150 (1954).
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compelled to care for them. 29 This goes to the heart of the problem, for
compensation proposals frankly reject ordinary negligence as the test, though
they may take extreme fault into account.30 This rejection of negligence in
turn rests on conclusions that fault-in the sense of clear ethical shortcoming
-does not play a very significant part in present-day accidents,3 ' that
modern industrial enterprises and activities like motoring will continue to
take a more or less inevitable toll of life and limb, and that the accident
loss should be reckoned as a cost of the activity which causes it and dis-
tributed broadly among those who benefit from the activity.
Opposition to the view just stated may come from a deep belief in
laissez faire and in the kind of individualism that saw freedom of contract
in the employment relationships of the early industrial revolution. Such an
attitude would equally condemn workmen's compensation as socialistic-as
indeed it did. Few would take so extreme a position today,3 2 but it cannot
be said that the insurance principle should be applied to all accidents, or to
all automobile accidents, simply because it is widely accepted for work
injuries. The question is not so much whether the principle of social insur-
ance is valid as where the line should be drawn in its application.
Proponents of automobile compensation point to workmen's compensa-
tion, which is widely conceded to be sound,33 as far as it goes, and to the
similarities between the problems of automobile and industrial accidents.3 4
Opponents who are willing to accept compensation for work injuries seek
to distinguish automobile accidents by arguing that in the latter there is no
29. See McVay, Reply to "The Case for Compulsory Automobile Compensation
Insurance," 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 162, 166-67 (1954) ; McVay, The Case Against Compulsory
Automobile Insurance, 15 OxIo ST. L.J. 150, 152-53 (1954); Ryan & Greene, supra note
28, at 121; Sherman, supra note 28, at 599-60.
30. It may be taken into account as the basis of further liability in the case of
extreme fault on the part of a person causing injury to another, or as the basis for
reducing or barring compensation to a claimant.
31. See GREEN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 59-60; James & Dickinson, Accident Prone-
ness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1950) ; Lewis, The Merits of the Auto-
mobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 583, 588 (1936) ; Marx,
Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory
Automobile Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 134, 136-38 (1954); Netherton, Highway
Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 110, 111-12
(1954).
32. Even Holmes, who in 1881 espoused the fault principle so completely, HOLMES,
THE CoMMoN LAW 96 (1881), thought in 1897 that the question of "how far it is desirable
that the public should insure the safety 'of those whose work it uses," was "open to
reconsideration," though he was not prepared to say how he "should decide if a recon-
sideration were proposed." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 467(1897).
33. Criticism is directed chiefly against limitations on and inadequacy of benefits
under some state systems, the exclusiveness of the compensation remedy, and adminis-
trative features of the acts. See, e.g., Bear, Survey of the Legal Profession--Work-
men's Compensation and the Lawyer, 51 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 965 (1951); Conard, Work-men's Compensation: Is It More Efficient Than Employer's Liability?, 38 A.B.AJ.
1011 (1952) ; Horovitz, Editorial, 10 NACCA L.J. 17, 32 (1952).
34. COLUMBIA STUDY 134-35; SASKATCHEWAN SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON THE PROBLEM
OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIM s OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT 55-56 (1947) ; Marx,
"Motorisin" Not "PedestrianismW': Compensation for Automobile's Victims, 42 A.B.A.J.
421, 426, 477-78 (1956).
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"sphere of endeavor" which causes the losses and no business enterprise
through which the automobile owners can pass on their costs as can an
employer.3r In automobile cases, they claim, the relationship between the
parties does not warrant special treatment and does not assure the curbing
of abuses. The automobile often injures a child or a housewife whose eco-
nomic loss cannot be measured as can a worker's.8 6 And finally, they argue
that there is no reason to single out automobile accidents when there are
so many other sources of accidental injury, such as the home.
A comparison of the findings in the Columbia Study and the Railroad
Study shows striking similarities in the economic consequences of accidents
and in the inadequacy and inequality of compensation under common law
systems in the fields of automobile accidents and work injuries. The social
need for adequate and equitably distributed compensation is much the same;
the differences do not seem weighty. Of course, automobile owners are not
engaged in a joint venture for profit, but they do represent the class of
people who benefit directly from motoring and who-like the ultimate con-
sumers of the employer's products-may fairly be asked to contribute to
the losses which their common activity of motoring causes. Thus there is
a relationship between the parties sufficient to warrant strict liability, but
it is a relationship that probably will not supply the same automatic check
on malingering and other abuses as does the employment relationship.37
However, this does not mean that such abuses would be greater in auto-
mobile cases under compensation than they are at present. The problem
of compensation for those not gainfully employed is not serious.38 And the
objection to singling out the automobile approaches the trivial. The auto-
mobile accident has singled itself out, as its frequency and its economic
consequences plainly show. It is perfectly true that automobile accident com-
pensation is not a complete answer to all our woes. A good case can be
made for a much broader type of social insurance, perhaps covering all
disabilities from accident or illness. But those who raise the present objec-
tion would be the last to espouse anything like that. Their complaint is
levelled against any extension of social insurance, and it is garbed in trans-
parent hypocrisy when directed to the incompleteness of any proposed step.
I do not mean by this to belittle the resistance to steps which move away
from individualism and laissez faire. We have witnessed a great resurgence
35. See Lilly, supra note 28, at 805; Ryan & Greene, supra note 28, at 117. For anadmirable description and analysis of the similarities and dissimilarities, for this purpose,between industrial and automobile accidents, see Grad, supra note 15, at 325-27.
36. See Sherman, supra note 28, at 603.37. This objection was particularly stressed in Lilly, supra note 28.38. Actual economic loss should be taken as the guide in all cases. While childrenand housewives may not earn wages, there may well be economic loss in terms of the needto hire a housekeeper and the like. Saskatchewan assigns an arbitrary amount to cover
losses of this nature. SASKATCHEWAN SPECIAL. COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF COM-
PENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT 76 (1947).
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of this resistance as an emotional and political force since the war. This in
itself may help to account for the failure of compensation to receive wider
acceptance during that time, though it does not account for that failure during
the years of depression and the New Deal. What I do mean is that this
resistance is no longer an across-the-board intellectual attitude, except among
a few visionary die-hards.30 Automobile compensation administered by pri-
vate enterprise fits well within patterns now long familiar on the American
scene.
Less extreme than an insistence on keeping the whole individualistic
fabric of fault, and more widespread, is the feeling that no one should recover
for an injury resulting from his own gross fault. The literature in opposition
to compensation has many a reference to the drunken driver and even to the
"drunken pedestrian running into the rear of a slowly moving car."40 It
may be that this reflects the prevailing attitude of people generally. If it
does, then this should be reflected in a compensation scheme by providing
that a claimant's gross fault will bar or diminish his award.
It may be noted in passing that loyalty to the fault principle may be
inspired not only by a conservative philosophy but also by a desire to justify
the very large award as one against the "wrongdoer." As may be expected,
those who seek this justification are quite willing to see the requirement
of fault diluted to the point where it no longer has any significant ethical
content and is seldom a bar to liability.41
Some opponents see in compensation an invitation to carelessness, 42 but
such a fear is surely groundless. The stricter liability will if anything increase
the incentive to exercise care, and insurance against liability will not engender
irresponsibility under a compensation system any more than it does at pres-
ent.43 There also is no more reason to suppose that individuals will be
readier to risk injury for certain but modest awards than they are for the
chance under the present system of the very large awards which are so
widely publicized. Workmen's compensation was followed by a very mate-
rial decrease in industrial accidents, 4 and while automobile compensation
39. The theme that compensation would lead to state insurance and a narrowing of
the field of private enterprise runs through most of the literature of the opposition. See
articles cited note 28 supra. But the experience under workmen's compensation demon-
strates that this is not necessarily so.
40. Ryan & Greene, supra note 28, at 119; accord, Sherman, supra note 28, at 600.
While some opponents of compensation dramatize the possibility of such recoveries, many
writers have minimized the importance of genuinely blameworthy conduct as a large
factor in causing automobile accidents. See, e.g., James & Dickinson, Accident Prone-
ness and Accident Law, 63 HAgv. L. Rxv. 769 (1950) ; Netherton, supra note 31.
41. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Ihsurance, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 230 (1953).
42. See Sherman, supra note 28, at 600.
43. What data there are show that accident records tend to be better where insur-
ance is widely held. See 2 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 13.5 (1956) ; James AccidentLiability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. F49, 561-62(1948). But see Netherton, supra note 31, at 121-22.
44. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 13.5, at 775-76 (1956); Hall, Everybody's
Job, 47 Best's Insurance News, March 1947, p. 85, at 96 (Fire & Casualty ed.).
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may be less effective as a promoter of safety, there is no basis for thinking
that it would increase accidents.45
The next set of objections to compensation deal with expense and
adequacy. Spokesmen for defendants say that such a scheme would be intol-
erably expensive; those representing plaintiffs say that it would afford piti-
fully small awards. 46 These contentions are interrelated and raise interesting
and fundamental questions. So far as expense goes, that would depend on
the amounts paid in compensation. It would be possible to devise schedules
at such levels that the sum of compensation payments would not exceed the
total amounts now paid for tort claims. The Railroad Retirement Board, for
instance, found that railroads paid some 12 million dollars in claims and
judgments under the FELA for injuries (including fatal injuries) incurred
during selected months over a three-year period. It also found that the value
of the past and estimated future wage loss resulting from these injuries was
24 million dollars. 47 Actual payments varied from nothing to a great deal
more than the actual wage loss in individual cases. The same money could
have met about one-half of the wage loss in every case.48
The objection on the score of expense cannot stand alone. Whatever
we can afford to pay could be distributed according to compensation, rather
than common law, principles. The expense objection necessarily implies
that the sum now spent on loss payments would not provide for adequate
compensation.
Plaintiffs' men complain that a compensation system would yield only
a pittance. To this several things should be said: (1) Under the present
system the majority of persons get even less of a pittance, although a few
get much more. (2) Periodic compensation for loss of future wages gives
greater assurance that this loss will be replaced than does the same sum
in lump payment. (3) However justifiable some large awards may be under
the rules of liability and damages now in force (and many of them undoubt-
edly are), the great disparity in payments to those having similar economic
losses cannot be justified; and the system which produces these disparities
is inequitable.4 9
45. ". . . Saskatchewan highway safety officials state that compulsory compensationinsurance has no effect upon highway safety .... " Wis. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, op. cit.supra note 15, at 163.46. Typical defendants' views may be found in authorities cited note 28 supra. Forplaintiffs' views see Richter & Forer, supra note 20; Tyack, No Heaven on Earth:Compensation for Automobile Victims, 44 A.B.A.J. 354 (1958).47. RAILROAD STUDY 6. The total estimated wage loss was $30,500,000. The figuregiven in the text represented an adjustment for the present value of future earnings.The cost to claimants of acquiring the $12,000,000 was $1,000,000.48. This is something of an oversimplification. In death cases, for instance, theguide should be not wage loss, but probable contributions to dependents.49. The notion that liability should be based on fault would of course justify somedisparity in payments between persons having similar economic losses. But many factorsbesides fault enter into the disparities which actually exist today. Indeed fault is not
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Perhaps society can afford to pay more to its accident victims than it
is now paying, and perhaps it should. This, of course, will always be a matter
of debate and struggle. But however much or little society can afford or
should be made to pay, the first claim against that sum should be in favor
of meeting a substantial part of the serious economic loss 0 of all accident
victims. If anything remains, other considerations such as fault (with respect
to liability) and pain and suffering (with respect to damages) may be con-
sidered in determining how the remainder should be distributed.
In this, it seems to me, lies the answer to the question whether the com-
pensation remedy should be made exclusive. Saskatchewan does not make
compensation exclusive, and the cost there of liability insurance is exceed-
ingly reasonable.5 1 Actuaries estimated that the cost of a similar scheme in
North Dakota would be well within the bounds of reason.5 2 England no
longer limits the worker's recovery for work injuries to compensation.53
Some continental countries provide for strict liability in automobile cases
without limitation on the amount of recovery. 54 In none of these jurisdictions,
however, do the amounts awarded even remotely approach the sums awarded
in the urban centers of this country for comparable injuries. Liability insur-
ance rates here are already the highest in the world even though strict liability
has not been adopted. Whether our unparalleled and unprecedented material
prosperity would warrant putting our existing expensive system on top of a
even the principal determinant. Thus, the Railroad Retirement Board found a principalreason in the nonlegal "pressures and counterpressures that it is possible to exercisein the course of bargaining." RAROAD STUDY 120. See also id. at 48. The study con-ducted in Philadelphia found that although liability and actual loss played a part, "thereis rarely a clean-cut decision [on the basis of liability], but rather that it may be amatter of geographic location; who the persons involved are; circumstances of the in-sured and victim; the lawyer and doctor involved in the case and the like." TempleUniversity Bureau of Economic and Business Research, supra note 27, at 73. See alsoid. at 87, 91; Corstvet, sutpra note 6, at 468-69 (stressing the nonlegal bargaining
pressures).
50. Since the serious personal injury and fatal cases cause the social problem, prop-erty damage claims might well be excluded from the system. See COLUM IA STUDY22-23. The Saskatchewan plan provides a $200 deductible clause for property damaer'liability. SASKATCHEWAN GOVT INSURANCE OFFICE, Op. cit. suprq note 15, at 18. See also
GREEN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 96.51. The Saskatchewan compulsory policy protects the insured against liabilitv underthe compensation plan and in addition against (1) liability under the common law up toa limit of $10,000 for one person or $20,000 for more than one person inijlred or killedin one accident, and 'S5,000 for property damage in one accident (with $?V0 deductibleif the damage is caiised in Saskatchewan) ; and (2) loss from collision, hail, theft, flool,
wind, storm, and falling aircraft (with a $200 deductible clause). The cost of this insur-ance is graduated according to the wheelbase and age of the car. In 1950 the premium
for a 1956 Chevrolet was only $27.00. SASKATCHEWAN GOVT INSURANCE OFFICE, Op. Cit.
supra note 15, at 4-8, 35.52. Less than twice as much as Saskatchewan, if administered by state fund:between two and three times as much if administered by private insurers. N.D. LEGis-
LATIVE RESEARCH Cozm.. op. cit. s.nhra note 15. at 57.53. Lenhoff. Soria' Tnnirance Replacing Workmen's Compensation in England, 5
NACCA L.J. 49, 53 (1950).
54. See Malone, Dama.ge Suits and the Con taoious Princifle of Workin e's Com-pensation (pts. 1-2), 9 NACCA L.J. 20, 10 NACCA L.J. 44 (1952).
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compensation scheme may be open to some doubt, 55 although a combined
system would eliminate any duplication of benefits and might lead to a revitali-
zation of the fault requirement.
Other objections are also related to this matter of expense. It has been
argued that a compensation system is more expensive to administer (aside
from any question of payments to claimants), and that it will invite more
malingering and fraud than does the present system. If these charges are
well founded they would constitute drawbacks to extending compensation.
The charge of expense is based on a study comparing the cost of admin-
istering workmen's compensation claims in Illinois with the cost of adminis-
tering claims against Illinois railroads under the FELA.56 It was found that
the latter system "costs less per dollar of benefit conferred." 57 The principal
difference is in legal expense.58 While this is disappointingly high under
compensation, the apparently good record under employers' liability may
reflect an unhealthy state of affairs. The Railroad Retirement Board found
that employees were generally afraid of being fired if they brought suit, or
even retained lawyers to pursue their claims, against the railroad,59 which
acts as a self-insurer in these cases. This means that much of FELA is being
administered by the employers on a paternalistic basis and largely on their
own terms. Self-insurance is rare under workmen's compensation, and the
workmen's compensation board is generally accessible with an actively pro-
tective role to play. While the extent of litigation in workmen's compensation
is deplorable, it must not be overlooked that much of it serves as a protection
to the worker which is absent under the other system.
As to malingering and fraud, they thrive under the present system where
rewards for success are occasionally dramatically high.60 There seems to be
little reason to suppose that they will be increased by a system under which
payments are limited. It is true that compensation would remove the need
to fabricate facts to show liability, but the malingering problem is concerned
with the extent of injuries and disability, and the present requirement of fault
-diluted as it has become-affords no guaranty of trustworthiness in the
testimony about injuries. Perhaps the delays and other difficulties of the
55. An Australian writer would reject any residual tort action because (1) itwould siphon off money that should go towards financing compensation to pay "prizesfor those who would play the common law action," and (2) the present system is primi-tive and clumsy as a deterrent against carelessness. Parsons, Death and Injury on tileRoads, 3 U.W. Ausm. ANN. L. REv. 201, 273-74 (1955).
56. CONARD & MEHR, COSTS OF ADMINISTERING REPARATION FOR WORK INJURIES
IN ILLINOIS (1952).57. Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient Than Employer's Lia-
bilityf, 38 A.B.A.J. 1011, 1058 (1952). This article summarizes the findings of Costs
of Administering Reparation for Work Injuries in Illinois.58. CONARD & MEHR, op. cit. supra note 56, at 30, 42; Conard, supra note 57, at 1014.59. RAILROAD STUDY 37-38; accord, Pollack, supra note 6, at 240.60. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Liability Clahn Racket, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.491 (1936).
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present system discourage some false claims, but we know that they also
discourage many meritorious ones and weaken the bargaining position of
honest claimants. It is a harsh thing to deny or discourage meritorious claims
for fear of opening the floodgates to litigation and fraud. The law has often
done so for a time, but when the rule has finally been liberalized to accom-
modate merit, the flood has seldom come.
It is also true that continuing periodic payments present their own prob-
lems as a source of malingering and of protracting disability in more subtle
psychological ways that do not involve conscious dishonesty. But techniques
for combatting these problems exist,0 1 and at any rate the difficulties seem
less serious than those of a system rigidly tied to the lump sum payment.
Some opponents of change-largely from among the ranks of plaintiffs'
lawyers-see in a compensation scheme a threat to the institution of the jury
trial.6 2 A fair appraisal of this objection requires careful analysis.
In the first place, the objection would have little weight with those who
find the jury trial wanting. However, many Americans, including the present
writer, believe the jury trial to be of value in accident cases.03 We must
therefore proceed further with our analysis.
A belief in the jury system does not mean a belief that juries are being
given the right issues to try or the right guides by which to try them. Juries
played a valuable role in administering the law of seditious libel in sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth century England, but that does not mean that
the law of seditious libel was good. History has condemned that law, yet on
the whole praised the role of the jury under it.64 .Indeed, a great strength of
the jury is its ability to inject common sense, or contemporary popular
prejudice, into the administration of an archaic or a harsh or an unwise rule
of law. But surely that is no reason for keeping the rule. A belief in the
jury system has no logical tendency to justify either the present rules of
liability or the present rules of damages in accident cases. It would be entirely
feasible to have the disputed issues of fact which would arise under a com-
pensation system tried by juries.65
It is true that most existing workmen's compensation schemes have no
provision for jury trial. Two overlapping reasons have contributed to this
fact. Those who framed the American acts thought them so simple to
61. See SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES ON TORTS 454-55 (2d ed. 1952).62. Lambert, Editorial, 17 NACCA L.J. 23 (1956); McKenzie, What is Truth?A Defense of the Jury System, 44 A.B.A.J. 51 (1958) ; ef. Baer, supra note 33, at 974;De Parcq & Wright, Damages Under the F.E.L.A., 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 430 (1956);Lambert, Editorial, 19 NACCA L.J. 25, 31 (1957).
63. See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 16.10, 18.8 (1956); Cooperrider, 4Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291, 1299-1301 (1958).64. See CHAFEE, FR EE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 497-517 (1941); 13 ENcyc.
Soc. Sci. 636 (1934).65. In a few states the role of the jury is preserved under workmen's compensation.See HOROVITz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWs 291(1944) ; Baer, supra note 33, at 974-75.
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administer that they would present few seriously litigated issues and therefore
little need for juries.6 6 The legislatures also felt that the delays and expense
incident to full judicial trials-and especially to jury trials-were among the
evils of the older system to be avoided under the new one.67 Some may have
had a third reason: perhaps they expected that administrators would become
expert in problems of work injuries and could solve these problems better
than a lay jury.68
These reasons are all debatable. Experience has shown that workmen's
compensation has given rise to much litigation teeming with the kinds of
questions that could appropriately be left to a jury."" Doubt has been cast
on the relative efficiency and inexpensiveness of workmen's compensation
administration. And there will always be disagreement as to whether an
expert or a lay tribunal will solve questions of injury or disability in a way
more satisfactory to society.
If any jurisdiction reaches the point of adopting a compensation scheme,
it will have to decide whether to employ the jury trial. But this problem is
severable from the threshold question: what should be the bases of liability
and of damages?
Some opponents of compensation for automobile accidents stress the
shortcomings of workmen's compensation.7" The chief complaint is the inade-
quacy of payments under existing state laws. The matter of over-all adequacy
has already been treated. The present article is a plea neither for greater
nor for smaller payments, but rather for a more equitable distribution of
whatever we do pay. Some of these complaints, however, are directed against
faulty methods of distribution within particular compensation systems. These
features need not and should not be carried over to other systems. Thus,
arbitrary maximum limits on the number of payments or on sums payable
for medical expenses tend to discriminate against cases where the need is
greatest. If penury must be practiced, let it fall rather on cases where need
and hardship are least, by reducing or even eliminating payments on small
claims. Again, a failure to adjust continuing payments to meet changes in
66. See id. at 968; Horovitz, Editorial, 10 NACCA L.. 17, 28 (1952).67. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25HARV. L. REv. 328, 330-32 (1912).
68. Cf. FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 108-46 (1949) ; GREEN, op. cit. upra note 27, at 97.69. Some of them involve resolution of conflicts in the testimony. Examples arequestions about the fact of injury and whether, if it happened at all, it happened onthe job, the extent of injury or disability, and the fact and extent of dependency in fatalcases. Other questions quite appropriate for the jury's function involve an evaluation oflegal consequences within limits set by law. Thus the phrases "arising out of and in thecourse of employment" or "of the use or operation of a motor vehicle" present manydoubtful and close questions (even where facts are admitted) which could be resolvedby a jury just as well as are questions regarding "scope of employment" in vicariousliability cases today. See 2 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 26.8 (1956).70. See Tyack, supra note 46; cf. GREEN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 98-99; Baer, sitpranote 33; Horovitz, Editorial, 10 NACCA L.J. 17 (1952); RiCHTER & FoaRE, supra
note 20.
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the cost of living is a defect in all existing compensation schemes which
should be repaired in spite of the difficulties such adjustment would entail.
Other complaints are directed at the administrative side of compensation.
In work injuries, it has led to a disappointing amount of litigation. Much of
this turns on the deceptively simple phrase: "injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment."' 7 1 It must not be forgotten that most
of this litigation represents a constant extension of the borderlines of com-
pensation.7 2 Most of the cases litigated on this score would not have raised
a question of the employers' liability at common law. Virtually this whole
field represents pure gain from the point of view of those who would extend
compensation, although the gain may have cost more in terms of friction than
had been hoped. The other great sources of compensation litigation are
questions regarding the extent of injury and disability. It may be assumed
that a certain amount of this is inseparable from any adversary system
wherein there is some effort by society to control the bargaining process.
Litigation is a cost of this effort, and is probably worthwhile to curb the
current evils of the bargaining.73
Workmen's compensation has its drawbacks, more in some state systems
than in others. Automobile compensation would also have drawbacks, though
it need not borrow all of those to be found in the weakest existing industrial
accident systems. No one with any objectivity claims that the proposal would
be a "heaven on earth."74 But its detractors, I think, miss the woods for the
trees. All compensation systems proceed on a basically more equitable prin-
ciple of distributing payments for accident losses than does the common law.
All of them provide for continuing payments to meet future needs, and most
of them yield much prompter payments.
Why, then, has compensation failed of adoption in the automobile field
while it has been adopted so widely in the field of industrial accidents? Those
who do not like compensation will say that it is because most people disagree
with my conclusion that it is desirable. I think this may be partly true but
I doubt that most people have thought the problem through. The strongest
force in the picture is, I suspect, the force of inertia. For generations we have
thought of the civil recovery as coming out of a defendant's own pocket, and
we have felt that it was unfair to impose this individualized liability unless
the defendant was at fault. Yet this way of thinking no longer dominates the
stage entirely. One of our most perceptive trial judges has said that "the
71. Baer, supra note 33, at 968; cf. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469,
479 (1947).
72. See, e.g., Small, The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Trends on Agency-
Tort Concepts of Scope of Employment, 12 NACCA L.J. 21, 48-53 (1953).
73. What happens where the process of bargaining goes unchecked is the principal
subject of the Railroad Study.
74. Opponents of compensation, however, sometimes suggest that its proponentsmake such a claim. Tyack, supra note 46.
[Vol. 59
1959] COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 423
community no longer accepts as completely valid legal principles basing
liability on fault."75 Sixty years ago Holmes wrote that "the inclination of
a very large part of the community is to make certain classes of society
insure the safety of those with whom they deal."17 6 We know about auto-
mobile liability insurance, and we are affected by the "contagious principle
of workmen's compensation."77 And when as jurors we are called on to
play an actual part in the working of the system, these factors have a very
great influence on us-we tend to make the present system work in the
actually litigated cases something like the way compensation would. Today's
judges do something of the same thing when they liberalize tort rules and
enlarge the jury's sphere. This in turn probably has some tendency to stifle
the dissatisfaction we might have with the present system if we saw its
workings in the large.78 Moreover, there is nothing to publicize and dramatize
its hardships. They fall on scattered individuals, quietly.79 The human tragedy
indicated by the dry statistics of the Columbia Study and the Railroad Study
escapes the popular mind. No political pr.essure group is interested in playing
it up; and there are many vested interests in the status quo. Publicity and
drama exist, but only for the spectacular verdict or settlement. This makes
the present system appeal to the gambling spirit so strong in American culture.
Probably the large verdict and the recent liberalization of the legal climate
have done more than anything else to win over most of the organized labor
movement from their original espousal of workmen's compensation 0 to their
resistance to its present extension into the railroad field.s ' And there is great
and highly motivated opposition to compensation from the ranks of plaintiffs'
lawyers for the same reasons.8 2 Ironically enough, these same factors may
75. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1285 (1952).
76. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rxv. 457, 466 (1897).
77. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensa-
tion, 9 NACCA L.J. 20 (1952).
78. This raises the question whether one should applaud or deplore common law
developments which ameliorate the harshness of the present system. It has always
seemed to me that steps in what I think is the right direction should be welcomed for
the benefits they confer directly and that it is pretty speculative how much such steps
will retard the eventual accomplishment of more thoroughgoing reform. At any rate, the
question is academic. Any system we have will change and will respond to pressures
and social need whether or not we want it to do so; and while specific changes may be
checked or impeded, they will not be avoided by frank appeals to keep the present system
bad in order to hasten its end. Those who would work against reforms within the com-mon law framework for this reason are, therefore, driven either to futility or to disin-genuous tactics. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, Torts § 19.4 n.5 (1956) ; cf. Wyzanski, supra
note 76, at 1284-88.
79. See Corstvet, supra note 6, at 473.
80. See HOROVTZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAwS
7 (1944).
81. The resistance is not unanimous, but it is enough to deprive the movement of
effective labor support. See Pollack, supra note 6, at 261 n.77. The typical attitude of
counsel for railroad unions and plaintiffs may be seen in Richter & Forer, supra note 20.
82. The debates about compensation have been no more free from ad hominein
arguments than human disputes usually are. Each side points out the selfish interests
that motivate the other and charges his adversary with insincerity. Both sides try to
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ultimately build up counter-pressure, in favor of compensation, from insurance
companies and the premium-paying public. 83
The final question is whether we would be better served in the long run
by a process of common law development toward strict liability than by a
compensation scheme. Such a process is taking place now, and both courts
and juries are playing a part in it. It has gone far and will no doubt go
further in improving the actual operation of the rules of liability in litigated
cases. But this is not enough. There is good reason to believe that the bulk
of automobile victims fare no better today than they did at the time of the
Columbia Study, Moreover, the underlying inequities among payments remain.
Unless it can be shown that common law development can produce a prompt,
widespread, and, above all, equitable distribution of payments in accident
cases, it should be replaced by a statutory scheme of compensation for auto-
mobile accidents. 84
dismiss disinterested argument as coming from the proverbial "ivory tower." Suchattacks may be effective as polemics, but they are out of place in an objective consider-ation. The high degree of motivation on the part of the plantiffs' lawyers is men-tioned here not as tending to detract from the arguments they advance, but rather asone of the factors in the situation which tends to explain the nonadoption of compensa-tion as a matter of power politics.83. The study conducted in Philadelphia found: "Some company and some attorneyattitudes favor the development of a compensation coverage to help meet the present lia-bility situation. However, half of the companies surveyed opposed it on philosophical ortechnical grounds and most of the attorneys opposed it as an invasion of individual rights."Temple University Bureau of Economic and Business Research, supra note 27, at 91.84. Of course the liability to pay compensation would have to be secured by com-pulsory insurance or other proof of financial responsibility.Two of the most provocative and forward-looking writers in the field of torts haveproposed systems of loss insurance, rather than liability insurance, for motor accidents.EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIm (1954); GREEN, op. Cit.
supra note 27, at 87-92.
Where traditional criteria of tort liability are retained, the difference between lossinsurance and liability insurance is substantial. It is illustrated by the difference betweenthe medical payments provision and the liability provisions of the modern automobilepolicy. The former is basically an undertaking to pay "to or for" a specified class of bene-ficiaries certain of the expenses caused by accidents involving the insured automobile.It is a form of accident insurance carried by the owner for the direct benefit of himselfand others without regard to legal liability. The liability provisions are undertakingsto pay on behalf of the persons insured "all sums [within policy limits] which the insuredshall become legally obligated to pay as damages" for injury to person or propertycaused by operation of the automobile. The insurer's obligation to pay is thus conditionedon the ability to show the insured driver's tortious conduct.Where the liability of the insured becomes absolute, as under a compensation scheme,the difference between loss insurance and property insurance becomes less significant,although it may have procedural and administrative consequences.The present article is not concerned with a choice between the relative proceduraland administrative advantages of these different forms of insurance. Either may havethe features here suggested as vital. In my opinion, however, Professor Ehrenzweig'sspecific proposal lacks the needed force of compulsion, see James, Book Review, 43CALIF. L. REv. 559 (1955), while Dean Green's fails to provide for continuing paymentsto meet future needs and may call for greater expenditures than we are willing to make.In Professor Cooperrider's excellent critical comment on Harper & James, TheLaw of Torts, he notes that my co-author and I "have neither a legislative program nora systematic accident jurisprudence of [our] . . . own to promote." Cooperrider, supranote 63, at 1299. For my own part, I have long favored a complete legislative revisionof at least automobile accident law along the lines charted out by the Columbia Study,but we did not feel that a treatise on the law of torts was an appropriate vehicle forthe promotion of such a legislative program (although we believe that we made our
position clear enough to meet fully the requirements of good faith).
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